

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

15687

Fishing efforts have expanded enormously in the last 15 years. We do not know, generally speaking, whether there is a condition of overfishing now. There may be. What we do know is that it may rapidly approach. Indeed, I am confident the time is now when the maritime nations of the world must get together and must join in research and in appropriate conservation measures, lest these resources, which otherwise can be made renewable forever, will have totally disappeared.

THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of Executive M (88th Cong., 1st sess.), the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.

MR. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I would like at this time to express my strong support of the test ban treaty and my hope that this treaty will receive an overwhelming vote of ratification from the Senate.

The U.S. Government has advocated this type of treaty in negotiations with the Soviet Union since 1959. It has been proposed by two administrations, endorsed by the national platforms of both political parties, and supported by Americans of all political persuasion.

The treaty was finally negotiated last month because the Russian Government made to the United States a significant concession. Our Government made no concession from its previous position. The Russians abandoned their insistence on tying the test ban to a broader agreement on disarmament, without inspection safeguards satisfactory to us.

Mr. President, to reject the treaty under these circumstances would be to reject the approach our military and civilian leaders have urged toward disarmament over the last 10 years. We have been told by all our leaders that disarmament must be negotiated from a position of strength rather than weakness, for only if this were so, would our adversary be willing to make those concessions necessary for our protection. Many hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent to build up this type of strength. Now, when we have finally reached a position of clear military superiority, when we finally have the strength necessary to force concessions—as we did in these negotiations—how can we turn our backs on our own policies?

The only reason that would justify a rejection of this policy would be that the treaty as written dissipated our strength or endangered our security. I am not a military expert. But I accept the judgment of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the CIA, the Director of AEC, and the Director of Research and Development of the Department of Defense, that this treaty does not endanger our security. We have, as well, the commitment of the President that our weapons development will continue and that our atomic laboratories and testing grounds will be held at the ready so that testing can resume if our national security demands it.

I am also sure that one of the reasons for widespread public support and confidence in this treaty was the fact that it was negotiated by Averell Harriman, who has dealt with the Soviet Union longer than any other public figure in this country; who was the first to warn of the danger after the war; and who has become, over the years, the symbol of the hard, skeptical approach toward doing business with the Russians.

Mr. President, the Russians have their own reasons for wanting this agreement, as we have ours. We do not know whether there is a direct relation between the new Soviet attitude and their differences with the Chinese. Russia has withdrawn aid for Chinese nuclear development. The two nations have cut trade severely. They denounce each other publicly almost every day. The Russians have given aid to India, China's enemy. The Chinese have accused the Russians of plotting to recognize Formosa, and of encouraging open rebellion among minority groups in the north of China.

The significance of this can be seen if we consider, that if any one of these incidents had occurred between our Nation and, say, Great Britain, it would have been considered a most serious crisis.

These developments in the Communist world are partly the result of our strong and firm policies in recent years—a result of our military buildup, our world leadership and our willingness to stand up to the Communists regardless of the risk. The Russians have failed in Berlin, in the Congo, in the Middle East and elsewhere. These failures have shaken their hold on their Empire. Russia has been forced to make concessions to us to keep support of its satellites. In this situation, which can only evolve to our advantage, it would be a grave mistake to align ourselves with the Chinese against the limited test ban.

If we cannot arrive at a modest agreement like this, under present world circumstances, I do not know when we can. The overwhelming opinion of the people of my State is that this test ban agreement is an act of mercy, and that by this act we will earn the gratitude of the people of the world for freeing them from the twin threat of fallout and possible nuclear destruction, but that if we do not approve this treaty, our Nation will be singled out before all the world as the nation which fastened these chains on mankind.

This is a viewpoint that has been reflected in the distinguished publication of the Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, the Pilot, and in newspaper editorials in leading newspapers in Boston, Worcester, Haverhill, and Lynn. I ask unanimous consent that these editorials be inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Pilot, official organ of the Archdiocese of Boston, Mass., Aug. 3, 1963]

SUMMER THAW

"Prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."

In such direct and simple words the re-

cent Moscow agreement was drawn up by representatives from the United States, Russia, and Great Britain. The document on the nuclear test ban in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater was refreshing for brevity in days when extended remarks have a habit of finding their way into any written or spoken word. Some are of the mind that the whole thing is too simple and the innocents should beware lest it blow up in their faces. Others who do not share this suspicion, but who have their own reservations on Russian pacts, take a more hopeful view of the matter.

Least more be read into the wording of the agreement than was intended, it was quickly pointed out that "any other nuclear explosion" did not preclude use of these frightening weapons in wartime, nor did it forbid testing underground. For the latter, the United States wanted international inspection of sites, a condition to which the Russians would not agree because they felt this was merely a cover for spying.

Short as the meat of the agreement may be, it will be carefully analyzed before it is fully digested. Even though Mr. Rusk and his bipartisan group leave this weekend for the formal signing of the treaty, the whole business must be ratified by the Senate. The Members of this body are the ones charged with this responsibility by the Constitution and it is they who must ultimately answer to the American people. Already the President has called for a debate on the subject, and this debate is to involve all Americans, since this is a matter in the national interest.

Death is the lot of man, but the very thoughts of annihilation, which is what the thermonuclear arsenals of both East and West may hold, should be enough to make men and nations take any steps in the direction of peace. We are no longer at the point of killing by way of overcoming an unjust invader; we have reached and long passed what has been so technically and poitely called overkilling.

We are not anxious to cast aside security or military power for tainted promises. On the other hand, we are anxious to explore the avenues of peace in terms of modern challenges to our national welfare. The test ban treaty may suggest to many a rocky road, but even that can take us out of the sure path of destruction.

[From the Pilot, official organ of the Archdiocese of Boston, Mass., Aug. 10, 1963]

A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

Within 10 days of signing the nuclear test ban agreement we will be marking the 18th anniversary of the atomic blast at Hiroshima. If it is a time of promise, it is also surely a time for reflection.

The limited test ban treaty does not either outlaw the bomb nor does it make further testing impossible. Those who have signed it have, however, set their faces in a new direction and it is the direction of less terror rather than more, less destruction, rather than more, less danger rather than more, toward survival and against annihilation. Perhaps it is only a step, as everyone seems to say, but it is an about face, at least psychologically, and this is the most important thing of all.

We do not like to reflect on the Hiroshima anniversary; it was an unpleasant (at least) moment in our history. But the treaty just signed makes it possible for us to feel that we can manage somehow to face the day this year; up until now we cringed before it. The dread decision that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki has not yet been repudiated by the bulk of Americans; the set of our minds is not much different from what it was in 1945. In other words, we could do it again. But the treaty gives us reason to hope that change is in the winds.

15688

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

September 9

If Americans could work so hard, at what may be some national disadvantage, to clear the air of atomic fallout, one wonders if they could ever again set a poisonous mushroom cloud over any city in the world for any reason. Perhaps this is more important than the ban and the inspection and the signing and all the rest. There has been a change of heart and, where once in a mood of might we could wipe out a city of families, nothing like that will ever be possible again. We have not yet done our penance, but we are almost ready to confess our sins.

Probably it is typically American that we cannot put into words our change of heart, that we cannot say before the world a confiteor of our transgressions. We are called a people of action, more gifted in doing things than in explaining why we have done them. If this is so, the world may understand what it means for us to have pressed for and found a ban with which to tie our own hands as much as those of others. We can hope that they will see in this our gesture of repentance, our turning away from the shame of Hiroshima toward a stronger and a more rewarding light. Perhaps many Americans wonder why they have felt so pleased to be part of this new nuclear agreement, since it is such a small thing and so truly limited. The answer may be that our hearts have sensed a change, and with it something like a liberation.

[From the Boston Globe, Aug. 16, 1963]

WEIGHING THE RISKS

(By Uncle Dudley)

The military and scientific testimony on which the ratification of the limited nuclear test ban treaty will probably depend is now being presented at Senate hearings.

That this treaty will not unduly risk the security of the United States is the view of Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all members of the Atomic Energy Commission. Thirty-five American Nobel Prize winners take the same view.

The chief questioner is Dr. Edward Teller, "father of the hydrogen bomb."

Mr. McNamara has testified that this country has "tens of thousands" of nuclear warheads, 500 missiles and more than that number of strategic bombers. The American lead in atomic weapons, and in the ability to deliver them, has increased in recent years.

Two major questions have been raised by Dr. Teller. Soviet experience with higher yield nuclear explosions might enable the Russians in a surprise attack some day to deliver a superbomb which would destroy this country's ability to retaliate from land bases. One answer to this is that the United States has Polaris submarines.

The other point Dr. Teller makes is that Russia might gain an advantage in developing an antimissile missile warhead. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff are satisfied, because the treaty still permits nuclear tests underground, which cannot be detected (and do not poison the atmosphere). Atomic Energy Chairman Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, a Nobel Prize winner, believes that the warhead for an antimissile missile could be developed by underground testing.

All agree that the risks mentioned by Dr. Teller cannot be completely discounted, but Dr. Seaborg says they are "minor." He adds: "On balance we improve security with the treaty."

Perhaps the risk most feared by the Joint Chiefs is that a false sense of security will develop. But that can happen, whether there is international control of weapons or not.

Between the world wars, Japan got the jump at sea because the United States did not maintain its fleet at the strength permitted by the naval limitation treaties. In the 1950's, when no similar pact existed, this country became so overconfident because of

its air superiority that Russia went ahead in ballistic missiles.

Though the test ban treaty should relax tensions somewhat, it should give no sane person a false sense of security. It limits no armaments, leaves still unsolved the key question of international inspection. But it represents a hope that a turning point has come, and man over the years will gradually bring nuclear energy completely under control. On that the future of the race is likely to hinge.

In weighing the risks which will be incurred if the treaty is ratified, it is important to consider the far greater hazards if ratification should fail.

[From the Boston Globe, Aug. 9, 1963]

UP TO THE SENATE

(By Uncle Dudley)

As of now, prospects for ratification of the limited nuclear test ban treaty seem excellent, but the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority in the Senate creates potential boobytraps for any pact.

Bipartisan support is almost always necessary for ratification. When President Taft found that he lacked that for a treaty he dropped it. A great question of American internal politics can wreck a pact. The slavery issue prevented a two-thirds vote for a treaty annexing Texas; that republic had to be brought in by a joint resolution of Congress, which required only simple majorities in both Houses.

American adherence to the League of Nations, which seemed to have the public's support at the time, failed because President Wilson found himself unable to accept reservations offered by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, grandfather of the present Ambassador to South Vietnam. American foreign policy reverted to isolationism, with disastrous results.

A Senator has prophesied a vote of 79 to 15 for the limited test ban treaty. There is an overwhelming desire to make a beginning in the control of armaments and to avoid poisoning the atmosphere at the expense of generations unborn. The right to continue underground tests has evidently convinced the Joint Chiefs of Staff that national security is protected.

Yet Edward Teller, father of the hydrogen bomb, questions the treaty. Democratic Senator HENRY JACKSON, of Washington, wants to make sure that it does not give Russia an advantage in the development of an antimissile missile.

Republican Senate Minority Leader EVERETT M. DIRKSEN did not go to Moscow for the signing of the treaty, because he did not want to commit himself in advance, even by implication. Walter Lippmann suggested in Thursday's Globe that West German Chancellor Adenauer may hope that the Senate will attach reservations of substance, which could require British and Russian acceptance before the pact went into effect. That could wreck the whole treaty.

Two memories haunt Americans. One is Khrushchev's sudden ending of the nuclear moratorium a couple of years ago, to get a jump in the resumption of tests. But that did not prevent this country from resuming as well; the present treaty contains an explicit escape clause.

The other memory is of the advantage gained by the Japanese in the 1920's and 1930's under the naval limitation treaties. But that was due, not to deception, but to the failure of this country to keep its fleet up to treaty strength. Everyone realizes that the present treaty is but a small beginning; this time there is less danger of losing the peace because no one now assumes it has already arrived.

But the test ban treaty looks like a good one. Those who would show it to be otherwise carry a heavy burden of proof. Anyone who may seek to wreck it for reasons of per-

sonal or partisan political advantage will assume a responsibility of dimensions too awful to contemplate.

[From the Worcester Telegram, Sept. 2, 1963]

THE GREAT GAMBLE

As the testimony on the proposed nuclear test ban treaty draws to a close, most Americans share President Eisenhower's hope that "the agreement might open the way to better relations between the cold war opponents and, by small steps, bring about enforceable agreements for the reduction of the costly armaments race and progress toward the rule of law in the world."

Without question, hope is one of the main ingredients in the push for the treaty. There is also an element of trust involved. Not trust in the integrity of Khrushchev per se, but trust in his ability to see that an end to nuclear testing is in his own best interests, as well as everyone's else.

Trust and hope are risky things in international relations—especially when one is dealing with a dictatorship. There are many risks involved in the signing of this treaty.

No one can know for sure whether a halt to bomb tests will weaken our defenses in the long run. No one can know for sure whether the Communists plan to cheat. No one can know for sure whether the Soviets are making great progress on an antimissile missile, or whether the new period of international relaxation will prove to be a cynical Soviet tactic designed to seduce us into lessening our vigilance.

Under ordinary circumstances, it would not be prudent to ratify such a treaty. It cuts close to the heart of our national security. Expert witnesses have so testified, in opposition to other expert witnesses who think our national interests are safeguarded.

But these are not ordinary times, and nuclear bombs are not ordinary weapons. They do not lead to national security but to world insecurity. A nuclear arms race might prove to be a deadly risk for all mankind. Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, who used to be President Eisenhower's science adviser, told the Senators that there is no natural end to nuclear testing. "Every test raises questions as well as giving answers. There is no end to the race except one—war."

Another powerful argument for the treaty involves the radiation fallout hazard. No one knows how much danger there is to our children and grandchildren if nuclear waste continues to be blasted into the atmosphere, but some of the informed guesses are hair-raising. One thing cannot be denied—the ever growing concentration of strontium 90 and carbon 14 in the bones and tissues of children in North America.

The test ban treaty is not exactly a leap in the dark, but it is a leap into an uncertain future, where the perils are unknown. But the leap seems justified because, in this case, the known risks are worse than the unknown.

[From the Worcester Telegram, Aug. 17, 1963]

WEIGHING THE RISKS

No intelligent person can believe that the risks in the proposed nuclear test ban treaty are negligible. The risks are prodigious. The testimony of Dr. Edward Teller, and other competent witnesses before the Senate Armed Services Committee, makes it clear that we do not know for sure whether the Soviets are abreast of us in the anti-missile field and in other important phases of nuclear weaponry.

But the risks are also prodigious if we do not sign the treaty. An intensified nuclear arms race leading to bigger and bigger bombs probably would not strengthen our national security. Instead, it might lead to an intolerable heightening of international tension, with the result that an eventual atomic conflict would become increasingly likely. Nuclear blasts, by their very nature, kindle